The U.S.-Taiwan Trust Deficit
What will Trump give and get?
Pamela Kennedy in The National Interest:
At first glance, the advanced semiconductor supply chain not only binds Taiwan and the United States in a vital technological partnership but also is likely to become even more consequential as the AI race accelerates. Taiwanese companies, as the main producers of the most advanced semiconductors, and US companies, as the main designers and purchasers of these chips, depend on each other for this high-tech supply chain to function. This “silicon shield” posits that the United States has a strong interest in Taiwan’s security to safeguard the supply chain—and in deterring China from attacking Taiwan or otherwise disrupting it. The silicon shield has become even more vital to Taiwan as the chip industry has grown to encompass 21 percent of Taiwan’s GDP, driving record economic growth over the past few years.
Whether the silicon shield would hold in a moment of crisis remains to be seen. But the silicon shield concept does have a reassuring effect on Taiwanese people. Surveys in Taiwan show that majorities believe the silicon shield does have a protective strength by binding US and Taiwanese interests together. Unsurprisingly, when the Trump administration announced that it sought to onshore a significant portion of advanced semiconductor manufacturing capacity, Taiwanese trust that the United States would assist in a cross-Strait contingency dropped.
Given the potential for a catastrophic war between great powers if the United States were to intervene in a Chinese attack on Taiwan, with no guarantee of victory but almost certainly widespread destruction, the Trump administration’s reshoring industrial policy is a logical US hedging strategy. As Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick put it, “We cannot rely on Taiwan, which is 9,500 miles away from us and only 80 miles from China.” The problem with this, of course, is that replacing chips made in Taiwan with those made in the United States could make Taiwan a less important US priority and reduce the likelihood of a US military response.
Reshoring weakens the silicon shield, and may be why there is increasing doubt about the United States’ commitment: A new poll by the Democracy Foundation found that majorities in Taiwan doubted the United States would help defend the island. Lutnick’s view, anticipating such skepticism, is that the United States needs the capability to produce a domestic chip supply large enough to assist in a contingency. But to believe this reassurance requires faith in a partnership that the Trump administration is straining.
More:
WSJ: Tightly Choreographed Visit Masks Big Differences Between U.S. and China
The Free Press: The Myth of the Thucydides Trap Is Convenient for China
